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Introduction.
In the economic model under consideration, productive activities
of the firms take place during a sequence of periods with equal duration
and in such a manner that inputs at the beginning of a period result in
outputs which become available at the end of that period. Inputs are financed
by individuals which also play the role of consumers. The rewards of the out-
puts of a firm at the end of a period are distributed among the individuals
in the same proportion as each of them contributes in financing the inputs
at the beginning of that period. Under the assumption that only firms are
able to transfer goods from preceeding periods to succeeding periods, the
exchange of goods and services between individuals and firms take place at
the moments of period changing to be called time-points.
At each separate time-point, all agents are subject to budget con-
straints which are based on a price-system for each separate time-point. For
an individual, the budget cónstraint requires that, at each time-point, the
~~ This study was carried out at Cowles Foundation and was supported by the
Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Yure Research.
k~~'Phe suthor is indebted to Herbert Scarf and Martin Shubik for helpful
discussions.
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value of his consumption and his contribution in financing inputs of firms
may not exceed his income which is constituted by the value of his (labor)
supply and his part of the rewards generated by the outputs of the preceeding
period. For a firm, the budget constraint requires that, at each time-point,
the value of its inputs may not exceed the budget generated by the contribu-
tions of indíviduals.
For each period, firms maximize the value of their outputs, by
choosing a technologically feasible production which satisfies the budget
constraints. This process also determines, for each firm and for each period, a
dividend-factor defined as the ratio between output value and the end of a
period and the budget at the start of that period.
Zndividuals maximize an W-horizon criterion function consisting of
the discounted sum of single-period utility functions on consumption-supply
combinations, by choosing s sequence of consumption, supply, and contribu-
tions in financing the firms. It will be shown that, in the context an "in-
variant competitive equilibrium", to be defined later, these ~-horizon
decision processes can be replaced by single-period decision processes.
It is assumed that the economic system is invariant over time, i.e.:
the number of firma and individuals, the technology of the firms, individual's
consumption-supply possibilities, and individual's preferences are the in-
changeable over time. Then, the concept of invariant competitive equilibrium
(briefly: I.C.E.) is defined as an invariant price-dividend system together
with invariant action plans such that: (1) the action plans are compatible
with the optimization behavior of the agents, (2) the dividend-factors repre-
sent that ratios between output-values and the budgets of the firms, (3) Por
each period, the total supply of commodities is equal to the total demand.
- 3 -
Under assumptions which correspond with Debreu's suppositions con-
cerning production and consumption sets, and under concavity of the utility
functions, the following results are deduced: (1) there exists an I.C.E.,
(2) the "physical" part of an I.C.E. is compatible with any degree of infla-
tion or deflation, (3) under some additional assumptions, every I.C.E. is
Pareto efficient.
The paper is organized as follows. Section ~ gives an axiomatic
model of technology and of individual's consumption-supply possibilities,
and analyzes the consequences of the overall balance of goods and services.
In Section 2, the economic behavior of the firm is studied. In Section 3,
we study the economic behavíor of individuals. In addition, we show that,
in invariant circumstances, the behavior can be characterized by a single-
period decieion procesa. Section 4 gives the definition of the concept
I.C.E. and affírms the existence. Section 5 gives the results concerning
inflation and Pareto efficiency. Section 6 contains the proofs. (Standard
proofs are omitted).
The appendix (section 7.) contains some general properties concerning
convex sets and sequences of difference inequalities. A list of symbols is
added at the end.
The concept of I.C.E. might be considered as an hybrid of the usual
competítive equilibrium concept and the concept of invariant optimal solutions
in convex m-horizon programs (viz. [ 31 ,~ 5~ ,~ 8] ). The dynamic character of
the I.C.E. and its simplicity looks to be very appropriate with respect to
3c
the study of other dynamic phenomena, like money and banking
3c This aspect will be the topic of forthcoming studies by Shubik and Evers.
-~-
1. Basic Elements of the economic system.
1.1, Periods, time-points.
Economic activities take place at the sequence of "periods" with
equsl duration. The periods are numbered t- 0,1,...
The period numbered 0 is considered as the last passed period. The moments
of period changing are called "time-points". Time-points are indicated as
"the start of period t", or as "the end of period t".
1.2. Commodities.
We assume that there is only a finite number g of distinguishable
kinds of commodities. These specification is invariant over the periods.
In addition, it is assumed that the quantity of any kind of commodity, at
any time-point, can be any real non-negative number; implying that, at each
time-point, the commodity-space can be represented by Rg. Quantities of goods
will be considered at the time-points, only; they are denoted by non-negative
vectors, endowed, sometimes, with a sub-index refering (dependent of the con-
text) to the preceeding or the succeeding period.
1.3. Prices.
With each commodity k, real non-negative numbers pk~t, t- 1,2,...
are asaociated, representing prices at the starting points of the periods
t- 1,2,.... For all commodities together, the price-system at the start of
a period t is represented by s vector pt E R8. The value of a bundle of
commodities y E RB, relative to a price-system pt, is the inner product pty.
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The effective meaning of the concept "value" will be clarified in the con-
text of the budget constraints of the agents.
1.4, Individuals: consumption and
There are two kinds of agents: individuals and firms. With respect
to the commodities, the activities of individuals consist of consumption and
(labor) supply. We assume that there are m individuals, acting over all
periods. It is assumed that the consumption-supply activities take place
at the time-points. They are represented by sequences {(zt,wt)}~-~ C R}'g,
i- 1,2,...,m, where (zt,wt) stands for the consumption and the supply, resp.,
of individual i at the start of period t. We assume that, for each time-point,
individual's physical consumption-supply possibilities (i.e, appart from the
total demand and supply of commodities) can be described by "consumption-
supply sets" C1 C R}'g, i- 1,2,...,m, implying invariancy over time and
independency with respect to other agents.
1.5. Assumption on the consumption-supply sets {C1}m-~.
1.5-A1 :(0,0) E C1 (possibility of inaction)
1.5-A2 :(zl,wl) E C1 ~ tl wi E Rg I wi ~ wi : (zi,wi) E C1 (free disposal).
1.5-A3 :~ w E RB : V (zl,wl) E C1 : wl ~ w(boundedness of supply).
1.5-A4 : C1 is closed.
1.5-A5 : C1 is convex.
Later, the possibility of a particular consumption (non-satuation 4 3.3) and
of a particular supply (productive supply 4 4.3) shall be added to these as-
sumptions.
1.6. Firms: input, outputs, production sets.
Production is understood as an activity of transforming inputs at
the start of a period into outputs which become available at the end of that
period. In that context, firms are the only agents which choose and carry
out productive activities. We assume that there is a fixed numer of n firms;
the are indicated by an index j- 1,2,...,n. The production plan of a firm
d ~ m C R2'g where x~ re resents the in-j is denoted by a sequence {(xt'yt)}t-1 t' t p
puts at the start of period t and where yt gives the outputs which become
available at the end of t. We assume that, for each period, firm's technolo-
gical input-output possibilities can be described by "production-sets"
F~ C R}'g, j- 1,2,...,n, implying invariancy over time and independency
with respect to activities of other agents.
1.7. Assumption on production sets {F~}~-1.
1.7-A7 :(0,0) E F~ (possibility of inaction).
1.7-A2 :(x~,y~) E F~ ~ tl~~ E RB I~r~ ~ y~ :(x~,Y~) E F~ (free disposal).
1.7-A3 :(x~,y~) E F~ ~ tl a~ 1:~ S~ 1:(a.x~,B.y~) E F~ (possibility
of expansion).
1.7-A4 :(O,y~) E F~ ~ y~ - 0(no free production)
1.7-A5 : F`~ is closed
1.7-A6 : F~ is convex.
Proposition 1.7.1.: The assumptions 1.7-A1, 4, 5 and 6, imply the existence
of positive numbers a,8 such that, for every (x~,y~) E F~ : ly~l ~ a}S.Ix~I.
(Direct consequence of suxiliary proposition 7.4.)
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1.8. Total balance of goods; non-substitution of individual's supply.
Given the initial outputs {yJ}n- all paths of actions0 J-1
m{({(zt,wt)}m-1, {(xt,yt)}~-1)}t-1 have to satisfy:
m n
(1.8.1) E(Zt-wt) t E(xt-Yt-1) ~ o, t- 1,2,...
i-1 j-1 -
Such a path will be called feasible (with respect to {yJ}n- ) if, in addition:0 J-1
~
{(zt,wt)}t-1 C C1, i- 1,2,..m and {(xt~Yt)}t-1 C FJ~ J- 1~2,...n.
Note: the time-lag with respect to the outputs appearing in (1.8.1) is caused
by the fact that production takes exactly one period.
In the case of invariant actions (zt,wt) :- (zl,wl ), i - 1,2,...,m, t - 1,2,...,
and (xt,yt) :-(xJ,yJ), j- 1,2,...,n, t- 1,2,... with, in addition, y~ :- yJ,
j- 1,2,..., the balance of goods ( 1.8.1) reduces to:
m n
(1.8.2) E(zl-wl) t E(xJ-YJ) ~ 0.
i-1 j-1
In that context we shall speak from an feasible invariant state if, in addi-
tion: (zl,wl) E C1, i- 1,2,... and (xJ,YJ) E FJ, J- 1,2,...,n.
For this case, it should be clear that the necessity of supply by individuals
for invariant non-zero production is expressed by the following assumption.
1.8-A1: There is no invariant non-zero production {(xJ~yJ)}n- ~
J-1n
(xJ,yJ) E FJ, j- 1,2,...,n, satisfying E(xJ-yJ) ~ 0.
.i-1 -
Note that 1.8-A1 implies the condition formulated by ].7-A4.
Theorem 1.8.1.: Under the assumptions 1.5-A1, 3, 4, 5, 1.7-A1, 4, 5, 6, and
assumption 1.8-A1, the set of feasible invariant states is bounded.
Theorem 1.8.2.: Under the assumptions 1.5-A1, 3, 4, 5, 1.7-A1, 2, 5, 6, and
assumption 1.8-A1, for every initisl state {y~}n- a number M exists such0 ~-1
that all corresponding feasible paths {({(zt,wt)}m-1, {(Xt,yt)}~-1)}t-1
satisfy: ~ytp ~ M, j- 1,2,...,n, t- 1,2,...
Collary 1.8.3.: It should be clear that under the conditions, mentioned above,
the consumption-supply sets Cl and the production sets F~ may be replaced by
subsets C1, F~ defined by the relations:
1.8-D1: C1 .- {(zl.wl) E C1 I Z1 ~ z}, i- 1,2,...,m,
1.8-D2: F~ :- {(x~~Y~) E F~ ~ x~ ~ x}, j- 1~2,...,n,
provided the bounds z,x are taken large enough. Evidently we have the follo-
wing properties:
Proposition 7.8.4.: Each of the assumptions 1.5-A1 to 4 implies an equivalent
property with respect to the subsets C1. Moreover, 1.8-D1 and 1.5-A2 imply
boundedness of each C1.
Proposition 1.8.5.: Each of the assumptions ].7-A1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 implies
an equivalent property with respect to the subsets F~. Moreover, 1.8-D2 and
1.7-A4 imply (by proposition ].7.1) boundedness of each F~.
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2. The economic behavior of the firms.
2.1, Budget constraints of the firm; shares.
The proprietary rights over a firm, during a period t, are distri-
buted among individuals in the same proportion as each of them contributes
in financing the inputs at the start of the period. These contributions,
from now on to be called shares, will be represented by a sequence of non-
negative mXn-matrices {St}t-p; a matrix element st'~ stands for the shares
owned by individual i, at the start of t, with respect to firm j. Thus, given
a share distribution {St}t-1 and a sequence of prices {pt}t-~, the budget
m
constraints of the firms are formulated by: pt xt ~ E st'~, j- 1,2,...,n,
- i-1
t- 1,2,... Further, we introduce the possibility that shareholding of some
of the firms is open to only one or to part of the individuals. For instance
stock holding activities of an individual might be described as production
of a particular firm with exclusive proprietary rights. Assuming that these
restrictions are invariant over time, we express the possibilities of share-
holding by intervals wl'~ such that wl'~ :- {0} in the case that ttie share-
holding of firm j is closed for in3ividual i, and wl'~ :- R} otherwise.
This aspect also will be expressed by a subset ~ in the space of real mXn-
matrices Nlmxn, defined by: R:- {g E I~Xn I sl'~ E wl'~~ i- 1,2,...,m,
j- 1,2,...,n}. Self-evident we assume that, for each firm, share-holding
is open for at least one individual.
2.2. Choice criterion of the firm.
Given the prices {pt}t-~ and the shares {St}t-1, the economic beha-
vior of the firms is characterized by the programs:
- lo -
2.2-D1.: sup Pttlyt' over (xt,Yt) E
FJ,
m




Provided that, for some E st'J ~ 0, (zt,yt) is an optimal solution witk:
i-1
respect s period t, the yields oY the outputs over. that period is distribu-
m
ted among share holders in the fvllowing way: (st'J~ E st'J).p~}; 'y~,
i-1
i -. 1,2,...,m.
~Defining the concept of "dividend-factors" {{dJ}n } such that
t J- 1 t-1
m
2.2-D2: dttl . E steJ - pttl Yt~ j- ~~~~~...,n, t- 1,2,...
!- i-1
The payments of (liquidating} dividends to individual i can be written:
. . . ' ' ; ..
dttl'St'J' J- 1,2,...,n, t- 0,1,2,..., where dl.s~ "~ J- í,2,...,n
represents the payments resulting from prodizctive activities of the initíal
period.
'.3. Economic behavior of the firm under invariant ri.ces and shares.
Ur.der invariant prices p and invariant shares S, the economic behsvior
of a firm j is described by 2.2-D1 with (pt,St) :- ( p,S), t- 1,2,...
Limiting ourselves to bounded prcduction sets {FJ}n (viz. l.ó-D2) and toJ-7
an artificial maximum á with respect te dividend-factors (to be c:Larified
in 4 4.4 and 4.2.4) we replace the max. program 2.2-D1 by:
2.3-D1: ~j(P,S) :- sup p'yJ, over (xJ,YJ) ~ FJ,
m m
subject to: p'xJ ~ F. sl'J, p'yl ~ ~. E sl'J.
- i-1 - i-]
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The supremum ~j will be taken as a function from Rg x tt to R1. Further, we
introduce for each j- 1,2,...,n, a set-valued function FJ : RB X S2 M R}'g,
defined by:
m
2.3-D2: FJ(P~S) -- {(xJsYJ) E FJ I P~xj ~ E sieJ~ p~Yj -~J(P~S)}.
- i-1
Clearly, for each (p,S) E Rg x S2, the set F`~(p,S) gives the corresponding
optimal solutions of 2.3-D1. The following properties can be deduced by stan-
dard methods:
Propositions 2.3.1 to 2.3.4.: The assumptions 1.7-A1, 2, 5, and 6 imply the
following properties:
(2.3.1): tl(P~S) E R~ X S2 : FJ(P~S) i~ ~~ J- 1,2,...,m.
(2.3.2): The functions ~j : RB X f2 -~ R1 are concave and non-decreasing in
the second argument.
(2.3.3): The functions i~j are continuous in every (p,S) E R8 X R.
(2.3.4): The set-valued functions FJ : Rg x f~ ~ R}'g are upper-semi-conti-
~
nuous and convex.
3e A set-valued function I' : X~ y(X and Y normed spaces) is called upper-
semi-continuous if, for any {(xk,yk)}~ C XXY, the relations yk E r(xk),
k- 1,2,... and (xk,Yk)-~(x0,y0) for k~, imply: y0 E t(xD). (see for
instance Arrow and Hahn [ ]] ) .
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Proposition 2.3.5.: Assumption 1.7-A3 implies the following property:
If, for some ( p,S) E Rg x S2 : F"~(p,S) ~~, ~.(p,5) ~ 0, then everyJ
(zJ,yJ) E FJ(p,S) satisfies at least one of the equalities: p'xJ - Em-~ si'j
or p'yJ - á. Es-~ s1,J
Finally, starting from the max. problems 2.3-D1, we introduce, with regard
to the dividend-factors (viz. 2.2-D2), the set-valued functions
DJ : R8 X A y R~ (j - 1,2,...,n) by the relation:
2.3-D"3.
DJ(P,S):- a E [ 0,~
d:- ~j(p,5)~Em-~ sl'J, in case E~-~- sl'J ~ 0,
tl S E S2 : ~y(p,S) ~ d.Em-~ s1J, otherwise
Clearly, this definition ensures that, for every (p,S) E RB x R and every
corresponding dJ E DJ(p,S), condition 2.2-D2 is satísfied.
Proposition 2.3.b.: If the assumptions 1.7-A1, 2, 5, and 6 are satisfied,
then in every point (p,S) E R8 x n the set-valued functions D~, j- 1,2,...,n
are non-empty, upper-semi-continuous and convex. In addition: DJ(p,S) E[O,áJ.
3. Economic Behavior of Individuals.
3.1. Introduction:
The budget constraints of individuals differ in one remarkable
aspect from that of firms. Namely, individual's budget constraints on ad-
jacent time-points are linked by the delay between payments and proceeds
of shares. In fact, the entire dynamic character of the model is concentra-
ted in this feature.
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3.2. Budget constraints of individuals.
Given a sequence of prices {pt}t-~ and a sequence of dividend-factors
{{dt}n ~}~-~~ the budget constraints of the individuals i- 1,2,...,m are
J-
formulated:
3.2-D1: ptzt - Ptwt } En ~ s~~J - En 1 dt.st'~ ~ 0, t- 1,2,...~- ~- -
The initial shares Sp are supposed to be the given result of the initial perioá.s
t .- 0.
Since the amounts of shares, an individual buys, constitute a part
of his decision variables, the linked structure of the budget constraints,
caused by share holding, implies that all budget constraints of an individual
have to considered, simultaneously, over the whole time-horizon. However, in
the case of invariant prices and invariant dividend-factors, we shall deduce
that this system of budget constraints can be reduced to a particular single-
period budget constraint.
3.3. Individual's choice criterion.
Within the sets of admissible actions ( i.e. consumption, supply, and
share holding) we assume that individual's choice criterions can be expressed
~
by utility functions possessing the following structure :
3.3-Dt: Et-~(ni)t.~i(zt,wt),
'~ For a fundamental study relating this structure to postulates about a
preference ordering on a set of feasible actions, see Koopmans [6j.
where the scalars ni E] 0,1 [ are time-discount factors, representing
individual's time preference. The time-horizon h will be specified later.
Assuming that prices and dividend-factors are the only information about the
economic system as a whole, earning-capacity, being effectuated in the budget
constraints, is the only attractive aspect of share-holding. For that reason,
shares are not adopted in the utility function. Concerning the single-period
utility function Wi : C1-;R1, we make the following assumptions:
3.3-A1: ~i is continuous.
3.3rA2: ~i is concave
3.3-A3: ~i(0,0) - 0
3.3-A4: 3 zl E R8 : tl(zl,wl) E C1, a 1 0:(~.zltzl, wl) E C1
~i(x.zltzl,wl) ~ ~i(zl,wl), (non-satuation condition);
a vector zl with these properties will be called a non-satuation
direction).
3.3-A5: ( zl,wl) E Cl, (zl,wl) E C1, wl c w
i i i i~i(z ,w ) ~ ~i(z ,w ). (non-increasing w.r.t. supply).
A next aspect which has to be specified is the time-horizon h.
Technically it makes sense to assume an infinite horizon, meeting the
intuitive notion that individuals do not specify any terminal point, but,
implying the dubious aupposition that all individuals have, and actually use,
full insight about future prices and dividends. Clearly, this objection can
be relieved by assuming invariant prices and dividends. If, in addítion, we
restrict ourselves to invariant action plans under m-horizon optimization
with invariant prices and dividends, then it turns out that the ~-horizon
decision processes can be reduced to single-period optimization problems.
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Under general sequences of prices and dividend-factors, individual's m-horizon
decision processes is characterized by:
3.3-D2: sup Et-1 (ni)t.~i(zt,wt), over {(zt,wt)}t-1 C C1,
~{(st'~,...,st'n)}t-1 C(wl'1 x...x wl'n), subject to:
ptzt - Ptwt t E~-1 (st'~-dt.st-j) ~ 0, t- 1,2,...
3.4. Infinite horizon decision processes versus single-period optimization,
Given an invariant price-dividend system (p,{d~}~-1) and given an
initial share distribution Sp, we characterize individual's economic behavior
by:
3.4-D1: sup Et-1 (~i)t.~i(zt,wt), over {(zt,wt)}~-1 C C1,
i,1 i,2 i,n m C-i,1 -i,2 -i,n{(st , st ,...,st ) }t-1 (w Xw x ... xw )~
subject to: p'zt-p'wt t En 1(st'~-d~.st'~) ~ 0, t- 1,2,...J- -
where C1 are the bounded consumption-supply sets (viz. 1.8.3) and where
al'~ :- wl'~ n[0,~ , i- 1,2,...,m; j- 1,2,...,n, w being some artifieial
upperbound on share holding to be clarified in 4 4.4.
We define the corresponding single-period optimization problems as
follows:
3.4-D2: ui(p~d1~d2....,dn,SG) :- sup ~i(zl~wl)~ over
(zl,wl) E C1, ( sl'1, sl'2,...,s1'n) E(wl'1 x wl'2X ...X wl'n),s.t.:
p'zl-P'wl } En 1(1-ni.dJ).s1~J ~(1-ni). En 1 dJ.sO,J.~- - J-
Propositions 3.4.1 to 3.4.4.: Under 1.5-A3: For every admissible action
m
{((zt~wt), {s~'~}~-1)}t-1 of 3.4-D1, the following properties hold:
- 16 -
m(3.4.1): The series {Et-1 (ni)t,(zt,wt,st'1,...,st'n))h-1 converges;
in the next propositions we denete the limit point:
(Zl~wl~ {S1,J}n ).j-1
(3.4.2): Under 7.5-A4 and 1.5-A5: (( 1-ni),~i).(zl,wl,{sl,j}n 1) is anJ-
admissible action w.r.t. 3.4-D2, providéd the initial share
distribution is the same.
m
(3.4.3): Under 1.5-A4, and 3.3-A1: the series {Et-1(ni)t,~i(zt,wt)}h-1
converges.
(3.4.4): Defining ai :- (1-ni)~ni, the assumptions 1.5-A4, 3.3-A1, and
3.3-A2 imply: ~i(ai.zl,ai.wl) ~ ai.Et-1 (ni)t.~i(zt,wt).
Theorem 3.4.5: Under 1.5-A3, 1.5-A4, 1.5-A5, 3.3-A1, and 3.3-A2, we have the
following property: If, for any initial share distribution SO' (zl'~rl{sl'~}j-1)
is an optimal solution of the single-period program 3.4-D2 which satisfies
sl'~ - s~'~, j- 1,2,...,n, then, for the same initial shares {s0'J}n 1'J-
i „i
. A. . . . .
(zt,wt,st,1,.. ,st,n) :- (zl,wl,s1,1, ..,sl,n). t - 1,2,... constitutes an
optimal solution w.r.t. the m-horizon program 3.4-D1.
Note: the opposite is not stated; i.e. an invariant optimal action
plan w.r.t. 3.4-D1 will not necessarily generate an optimal solution w.r.t.
3.4-D2. Anyway, theorem 3.4.5 ensures that the "best" invariant m-horizon
actions will t,~ selected by tht~ single-period decision processes with the
appropriate initial share distributions. For that reason we accept the single-
period programs as adequate descriptions of the economic behavior of the
individuals under invariant prices and dividends.
:~
~~
For a fundamental study concerning convex m-horizon programming, see
Evers [ 4] .
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The optimal solutions of 3.4-D2 will be represented by the set-valued
functions, B1 :Rg x R} x~ o, R}'g x~1'1 x.,, x Wl,n~ defined by:
3.4-D3: B1(P~d1,...~dn~SD) -- ~(zl,wl,sl'~,...,sl'n) E C1 x wl'1x ... xi~l'n~
i i 1 n~i(z ,w ) - ui(P~d ,...,d ,SC),
P'zl-P'wl t En ( 1-n..d~).sl.j ~(1-n.).En d~ sl~J~-1 i - 1 ~-1 ' 0
Using standard methods, one can deduce the following properties:
Proposition 3.4.6.: Under the assumptions 1.5-A1, 3, 4, 5 and the assumptions
3.3-A1, 2: At every ( p,d1,...,dn,Sp) E R8 x Rt x S2 the functions B1 are non-
empty and convex. If, in addition, the point (p,d~,...,dn,S~) is such that
a(zl,wl) E C1 exists satisfying p'zl-p'wl ~ 0, then B1 also is upper-semi-
continuous in that point of the domain.
~. Invariant Competitive Equilibrium. ( I.C.E).
4.1. Definition.
We define "invariant competitive equilibrium" (abbreviated: I.C.E.)
as a combination of (1) prices p E R8, (2) dividend factors {á~}n ,(3) shares~-1
S E n, (4) consumption-supply ('zl,wl) E C1, i- 1,2,...,m, and (5) inputs-
outputs (x~,y~) E F~, j- 1,2,...,n, such that simultaneously:
a) Each ( z1,W1,{sl'~}n ) is optimal with respect to:~-1
sup ~pi(zi,wl), over ( zl,wl) E C1, sl~j E~l~j~ j- 1,2,...,n,
subject to: p'zl-p'wl t EJ-1(1-xi.d~).s1.J ~(1-ni). E~-1 d~.s1.J~
(As pointed out in g3.4, such an optimal solution may be considered as an
invariant optimal solution of the ~-horizon process 3.4-D1)
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(b) Each (zJ,yJ) is optimal with respect to:
sup p'yJ, over (xJ,yJ) E FJ, subject to: p'xJ ~ Em-7 sl'J.
(c) The dividend-factors {áJ}n satisfy:J-7
F'YJ - dJ.Em-7 sl~j~ j- 1,2,...,n.
(d) Total demand and total supply of commodities are equal; i.e.:
Em (zl-wl) t En (XJ-YJ) - 0.i-1 J-1
Under certain assumptions (viz. 4.2.8), condition (d) can be replaced by:
(d'). Total demand is not larger than total supply of commoditíes;
Em-7 (zl-W1) t En 7(zJ-YJ) ~ 0.J- -
A direct consequence of the equilibrium conditions is the following homogeneity
property:
Proposition 4.7.1.: If (p,{dJ}~, S,{('zl,wl)}~, {(zJ,yJ)}~) is an I.C.E. then
for every a~ 0, (a.p,{gJ}~, a.S, {('zl,wl)}m, {(zJ,yJ)}~) is an I.C.E., as well.
Previous to prove the existence of I.C.E., we deduce a couple of auxillary
properties which also contain some economic relevance.
4.2. Non-satuation, consistency of the price-dividend system, and Walras' law.
In order to introduce some necessary conditions for invariant price-
dividend systems to appear in an I.C.E., we call a price-dividend system
(p,{dJ}~) consistent if, simultaneously:
(a) For all directions of non-satuation {zl}m (viz. 3.3-A4): p'zl~ 0.
(b) For all i - 1,2,...,m, j- 1,2,...,n with wl'J ~{0} : rri.dJ ~ 1.
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(c) A number w~ 0 exists such that, for each j- 1,2,...,n, the relations
(x~,Y~) E F~, P'x~ ~ w imply p'y~ ~ d~.w.
Obvious, removing the artífical bounds in individual's decision process (3.~-D1)
or (3.~-D2),violating (a) and~or ( b), under non-satuation (3.3-A4), implies
that at least one individual would be able to increase his utility by increasing
his consumption above any bound. Formally, this would imply that the total balance
of goods expressed by equilibrium condition ( d) or (d') cannot be satisfied.
Violating ( c) means that, under price system p, there is at least one firm j with
a profit ration higher than d~; implying that d~ cannot be a well-defined dividend-
factor. Thus, we have:
Proposition 4.2.1.: Under 3.3-A4 ( i.e. non-satuation), consistency is a necessary
condition for an invariant price-dividend system to be a part of an I.C.E.
Consistency condition (b) gives rise to scalars {pi}~ defined by:
4.2-D1: pj :- min(1~ni), over i- 1,2,...,m, s.t.: wl'~ ~{p},
Now we can formulate the following consequences of the definitions:
Pro osition 4.2.2. to 4.2.5.: Under 3.3-A4, consistency of an invariant price-
dividend system implies:
(4.2.2): P ~ C
(4.2.3): Taking the artificial bounds in 3.k-D2 large enough, necessary
conditions for feasible solutions ( zl,wl,{sl'~}n ) of 3.4-D2
J-~
to be optimal are:
P'zl-P~wl t En ~(1-ni.dJ),s1,J -(1-ni).En ~ sÓ'~,
J- ~-
sl'~ - 0 in case n..d~ ~ 1.i
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(4.2.4): d~ ~ p~, j- 1,2,...,n
(4.2.5): If an (x~,y~) E F~ exists such that, for all a~ 0,
.( ry~ ,,~~ ) E F~ then p' x~ ~ d~ , p' x~ .
With the help of these properties one can find:
Theorem 4.2.6.: Under 1.7-A3 and 3.3-A4: Every combination
(p,{à~}n, S,{(zl,wl)}m,{(z0,y~)}~) which satisfies the equilibrium conditions
(a), (b), (c), (d'), also satisfies: p'z~ - Em- sl'~.i-1
(i.e.: firms fully use their budgets).
Theorem 4.2.7.: Under 1.7-A3 and 3.3-A4: Every combination
(p',{aj}~, g,{(Zi,vi)}m,{(z~,~~)}~),(p,{d~}~) being consistent~which satisfies
the equilibrium conditions ( a), (b), (c), also satisfies:
p`(Em-~ (zl-wl) t En ~(z~-y~)) - 0. (Analogy of Walras' law).
J-
Theorem 4.2.8.: Under 1.5-A2, 1.7-A2, 1.7-A3, 3.3-A4, and 3.3-A5: For every
(p,{d~}~, S,{(zl,wl)}~,{(z~,y~)}~) which satisfies the equilibrium conditions
(a), (b), (c), (d'),vectors wl E[O,wl], i- 1,2,...,m and y~ E[O,y~],
j- 1,2,...,n exist such that
(p,{d~}~, S,{(Zl,wl)}~,{(z~,y~)}~) is an I.C.E. (i.e. satisfies the equilibrium
conditions (a) to (d).
~.3. Individual's productive supply capacity.
Although 4.2.2. ensures that, under non-satuation, the price system is
non-zero, the possibility of an I.C.E. where none of the consumers earns any
income is still present. Next assumption, to be called "productive supply capacity"
rules out the possibility of such an equilibrium and, at the same time, indicates
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how an equilibrium with complete inaction can be excluded.
~.3-A1: For each i, a supply wl ~ 0, (O,wl) E C1 exists such that there
is a{(x~,x~)}~ satisfying the conditions:
(a) d a~ 0: a.(xl,xl) E F~~ J - 1,2,...,n
(b) E~-1(x~-p~-x~) t w~ ~ 0, {p~}~ being the scalars defined
by 4.2-D1.
Clearly, condition (a) states that {(x~,x~)}~ can be produced in any multiple;
(b) requires a net output of all kinds of commodities with a rate of productivity
which is high enough to attract share holders.
Theorem 4.3.1.: If the assumptions 3.3-A4 and 4.3-A1 are satisfied, then a number
v~ 0 exists such that, for every consistent price-dividend system (p~{d~}n-
)
j-1 '
there are vectors {wl}m satisfying: (O,wl)
E C1, p'N1 ~ v. Ip11, i- 1,2,...,m.
Theorem 4.3.2.: If the assumptions 1.5-A1, 1.5-A5, and 3.3-A1 to 4 are satisfied,
and if, for some individual i, there is a supply wl as described in 4.3-A1 such
that ~i(O,a.wl)~a-~0 for a-i}0 then, under a consistent DriaP-rii~i.~A~~ ~y~~--
(p~{d~}n), a necessary condition for (zl,wl,{sl'~}n ) to satisfy equilibrium1 ~-1
condition (a) is: 'zl ~ 0, wl ~ 0.
4.~~. The existence of an invariant competitive equilibrium.
We start with some suxiliary definitions and proposition. First of all,
we observe that, by virtue of 4.2.1., k.1.1., and 4.2.2., we may restrict
ourselves to invariant prices in the set:
4.4-D1: P:- {p E Rg I(p~ ~- 1},
Earlier we deduced that, under a number of assumptions, we may limit ourselves
to the bounded subsets {C1}m,{F~}~ (viz. 7.8.3) and to dividend-factors in an
interval [O,a] (viz. 2.3-D1 and 4.2.4).
With bounded production sets {F~}~ and with prices p E p, theorem 4.2.6. implies
that only shares {{sl~~}m }n in bounded intervals {{wl~~}m }n have Y,o bei-7 ~-1 i-] ~-l
considered (viz. 3.4-D1, provided w is chosen large enough). Summarizing these
arguments we have:
Proposition 4.4.1.: Under ].5-A3, 1.7-A1 to 6, 1.8-A4, and 3.3-A4: a combination
(p,{d~}~, g,{('yl,wl)}m,{(X~,yr~)}~), with p E P, satisfies the equilibrium
conditions ( a), (b), ( c), (d') if and only if, simultaneously:
(~) (íl,wl,sl't,...,sl'n) E B1(P~d1,...,dn,S)~ i - 1~2,...,m.
(2) (X~.Y~) E ~(P~5)~ .J - 1~2,...,n.
(3) fl~ E D~(P~S)~ J- 1,2,...,n.
(4) Em-~(zl-wl) t E~-~(z~-y~) ~ 0.
In order to preserve the upper-semi continuity property of the set-valued
functions B1 (viz. 3.4-D3) describing individual's economic behavior, we
introduce set-valued functions B1~ operating on the same domain~by the rel.ation:
4.4-D2: B1(P,d~,...,dn, S~) :-
-- }(zl,wl,sl'~,...,sl'n) E C1 x wl'~ x...x wl'n ~
i i i,1 i,n 1 n E(z ,w ,s ,...~s ~P~d ,...,d , S~)
E closure (graph (B1; R~ x Rt x n)) ~,
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Adding the assumption 4.3-A1 to the assumptions of proposition 4,4,1., theorem
4.3.1. and proposition 3.4.6. imply that condition (1) of proposition 4.4.1.
can be replaced by:
(1') (zl,wl,sl'1,...,s1'n) E B1(P,dl,...,dn, S).
Combiningthe set-valued functions B1, F~, and D~, we define
G: P x[ b,a] n X Sl ~[ O,a] n X ~ X V by the relations:
4.4-D3: 1 nG(g,d ,...,d , S) .-
.- {(dl,...,dn, S, v) E[1,~ n x n X Rg ~
~{(zl,wl)}m C R2'g, {(x~,y~)}~ C R2'g:
i i i,1 i,n i 1 n(z ,w ,s ,...,s ) E B (p,d ,...,d , S), ] - 1,2,...,n
(x~,Y~) E F~(g,s), d~ E D~(P,S), j- 1,2,...,n,
v- E~-1(zl-wl) t En 1(xl-Y1) ~.J-
The set V, appearing in the domain is defined by:
4.4-D4: V:- {v E Rg ~ Iv~1 ~ s},
wYiere S is such large that, for every ( z,w) E Em-1 C1, (x,y) E En-1 F~,
J-
(z } w t x t y) E V.
Clearly, by 2.3.1., 2.3.4., 2.3.6., 3.4.6,, 4.4-D2, and 4.4-D3 we may conclude
that, under the appropriate assumptions, the set-valued function G is non-
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empty, convex, and upper-semi continuous in every point of its domain.
Finally we introduce the set-valued functions P: V y P and
H: P x[ O,á] n x~j x V w p x[ p~á] n x n x V by the relations:
4.4-D5: P(v) :- {p E P I p'v - (max p'v, over p E P)}
4.4-D6. H(g,d~,...,dn, S, v) .-
:~ {(p.d],...,dn, S,V) E P(v) x G(P,d],...,dn, S)}.
Since P: V~ P is non-empty, convex and upper-semi continuous in every point
of its domain, and since the same can be said from the set-valued function G,
we have:
Proposition 4.4.2: Under the assumptions 1.5-A] to 5, 1.7-A], 2, 5, 6 and
3.3-A1, 2: The set-valued function H(viz. 4.4-D6) is non-empty, convex, and
upper-semi continuous in every point of its domain.
Proposition 4.4.3 and 4.4.4: Under the assumptions ].5-A1 to 5, 1.7-A1 to 6,
].8-A1, 3.3-A1 to 5, and 4.3-A7:
(4.4.3) A combination (p,{cl~}~, S,{(zl,wl)}m),with p E P, satisfies the
equilibrium conditions (a), (b}, (c), (d') if, and only if,
(p,{d~}~, S,v), with v:- Em-~(zl-wl) t En ~(z~-y ) , is a fixed-point
J-
of H; i.e. (P,d],...,dn,s,v) E H(P,d],...,án, S,v).
(4.4.4) The set-valued function H possesses a fixed~oint.
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Using standard methods (see for instance Debreu [2]), proposition (4.4.3) can
be found by elaboration of the definitions 4.4-D2 to 6 and proposition (4.4.1}.
By virtue of Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, proposition (4.4.2) follows from
(4.4.2) and the fact that the domain of H is non-empty, convex, and compact.
A direct consequence of (4.4.3), (4.4,4), and (4.2.8) is the following
existence theorem:
Theorem 4.4.5: Under the assumptions 1.5-A1 to 5, 1.7-A1 to 6, 1.8-A1, 3.3-A1
to 5, and 4.3-A1, there exists an I.C.E.
5. Particular properties of an I.C.E.: inflation and deflation, Pareto efficiency.
~t
5.1. Inflation and deflation.
C~nsidering the definition of the decision prosesses 2.2-D1 and 3.3-D2,
one can deduce the following properties:
Proposition 5.~.7: Let {(pt,{át}n ~)}t-1 be sequence of prices
and dividend-
J-
factors. Let {(Zt,wt,{st'~}n ~)}t-1 be an action plan which is admissible (or
J-
optimal) w.r.t. 3.3-D2 under the initial shares {sl'~}n and the price-dividend0 ~-1
1 ~. .. , - -
~yótèïii (pt,at,...,atJ :- (Pt,dt,...,dt), t - 1,2,....
Then, for every sequence of positive numbers {yt}t-~ with y~ :- 1, the action
plan {(zt,wt,Yt.st'1,...,yt.st'n)}t-1 is admissible (or optimal) w.r.t.
3.3-D2 under the same initial shares and the price-dividend system
(Pt,dt,...,dt) :- (Yt.Pt, (YtIYt-1).dt,...,(Yt~Yt-1).dt), t - 1,2,...
Proposition 5.1.2.: Let {(pt,St)}t-1 be a sequence of prices and shares.
~
Let {(xt,yt)}t-1 be an actíon plan which is admissible ( or optimal) w.r.t.
This section is based on a suggestion of Shubik.
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2.2-D1 with ( pt,st'J,...,st~J) : - (Pt~st'J,...,st'J)~ t - 1~2,....
Then, for every sequence of positive number {yt}1, the same action remains
admissible ( or optimal) under ( pt,st'J,...,st'J) :- Yt'(pt'st'J' " ''st'J)'
t- 1,2,.... In addition, concerning the dividend-factors the relations
m 'Y~~ J J ,J
pttl yt - dttl ' Ei-1 st ~ t- 0,1,... imply:
Yttl'pttl yt -(Yttl,yt)'dttl'Em-1 yt.steJ~ t- 0,1,...
Now, starting from an I.C.E. (p,{àJ}~, S,{(zi,wl)}m,{(zJ,'yJ)}i) and describing
inflation (or deflation) with the help of positive numbers {yt}~ , Y~ ;- 1
in the following manner:
5.1-D1. pt :- yt.p, t- 1,2,...,
the fact that an I.C.E. generates invariant optimal action plans gives rise
to the following property:
Theorem 5.1.3: Let (p,{dJ}~, S,{(Zi,wi)}m,{(zJ,9J)}~) be an I.C.E.
Then, for every sequence of positive numbers {yt}~, y~ :- 1:
(1) for each i- 1,2,...,m, the action plans
. . . . . n. ~.
(zt,wt,st'1,...,st'n) :- (zl~Wl,Yt.sl'1,...,yt.sl'n)~ t - 1,2,... are
optimal w.r.t. 3.3-D2 with ( s~'1,...,s~'n) ; - (Si,1,...,si,n).
pt :- yt.p, t- 1,2,..., and dt :- (Yt~Yt-1).dJ~ j- 1,2,...,n, t- 1,~,...
(2) for each j- 1,2,...,m, the action plans (x ~Yt) :- (zJ,yJ)~ t - 1,2,...
are optimsl for 2.2-D1 with pt :- yt.p, t- 1,2,... and
S~sJ :- yt.S1sJ~ i- 1,2,...,m, t- 1~2,...
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(3) Ytt1'P -(Yt~Yt-~).dJ. Em-~
sl.J~ ~- ~~2,...,n, t- 1,2,...
Briefly, the "physical" part of an I.C.E. is compatible with any degree of
inflation or deflation.
5.2. Pareto efficiency.
In order to study Pareto efficiency in the context of m-horizon
action plans, we introduce two optimality criteria: Given the initial outputs
{yJ}n- a feasible path {({(zi, wi}}m ,{(xJ~yJ)}n- )}" (viz. 4 1.8)0 J-0' t t i-1 t t j-1 t-1
is called strictly efficient if no feasible path
m{({(Zt,wt)}m-i,{(xt,yt)}~-~)}t-~ exists such that:
~
(a) Et-~ (ni)t.cyi(zt,wt) ? Et-~ (ni)t.cpi(ztswt), i - 1,2,...,m,
with strict inequality for at least one i.
In the concept of weak efficiency these condition is replaced by:
(b) mi(zt~wt) '~i(zt~wt)~ i- 1,2,...,m, t- 1~2,...
with strict inequality for at least one pair (i,t).
Note that feasible paths are bounded (viz. 1.8.2), implying that the ~-horizon
utility functions iii (a) are well-defined. Clearly,strict efficiency implies
weak efficiency.
In the next part it will be shown that, under some extra assumptions,
every path generated by an I.C.E. is weakly or strictly efficient.
These assumptions are:
j.2-A1: For each FJ: a~ 0, (xJ,yJ) E F"~ implies: a.(xJ,yJ) E FJ.
(i.e. linearity of the technology).
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5.2-A2: The numbers {pj}~-1, defined by 4.2-D1, are equel.
5.2-A3: The time-discount factors {ni}m-1 are equal.
(Note: 5.2-A3 implies 5.2-A2).
The following suxiliary propositions can be deduced easily:
Proposition 5.2.1.: Consider, for each j- 1,2,...,n, the programs:
(a) sup p'y~, over (x~,Y~) E F~, s.t. p'x~ ~ S.
(b) inf (-p'y~ t d.p'x~), over (x~,y~) E F~.
Suppose assumption 5.2-A1 is satisfied. Then, given (p,s) E RB}1, every optimal
solution (x~,y ) of (s) is optimal with respect to (b) with the same p and d
such that p'y~ - á.s.
Proposition 5.2.2. and 5.2.3.: Consider, for each i- 1,2,...,m:
(a) sup mi(zl,wl), over (zl,wl) E C1, s.t. p'zl-p'wl ~ y..- 1
(b) inf p'zl-p'wl, over ( zl,wl) E C1, s.t. ~i(zl,wl) ~ ai.
Then, under 3.3-A4, the following properties hold:
(5.2.2): If, for some ( p,yi) E RBt1~ (Zl~Wi) is optimal w.r.t. ( a), then
(il,wl) is optimal w.r.t. (b) with the same p and a. ;- ~,(Zi~~i),i i
(5.2.3): Let (p,yi) be such that (a) possesses an optimal solution.
Then every optimal solution of (b), with ai :- sup in (a) and the
same p, is optimai w.r.t. (a).
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Exploring this proposition (viz. the proof in section 6) one can deduce:
Theorem 5.2.4.: Under the assumptions 1.5-A1, 3, 4, 5, ].7-A1, 2, 5, 6,
7.8-A1, 3.3-A1, 2 and 5.2-A1, 2: every path of consumptíon-supply and production
activities, generated by an I.C.E. is weakly efficient. If, in addition, 5.2-A3
is satisfied then such a path is strictly efficient.
6. Proofs.
Proof of 7.8.7, and of 7.8.2.: ].5-A3 implies the existence of a vector w
such that E~-1 C1 C RB x[O,wj. For such a vector w:
(1) d(z,w) E Em-7 C1, (x,Y) E En-1 F~ I z-wtx-Y ~ 0: ztx-Y ~ v.~ - -
Defining A:- {(a,v) :- (ztx,y)I(z,w) E E~ C1, (x,y) E En- F~}, we have:i-1 ~-1
(2) A is closed and convex. (To be deduced from closedness and convexi.ty
of the sets C1 and F~, and from {C1}m, {Fd}~ C R}'g).
(3) (o,o) E A.(By 1.5-A1 ana 1.7-A1).
(4) A n({o} x Rg) is bounded. (By 1.8-A1 and {Cl}m, {F~}~ C R}'g).
(5) 2a,s E R~ : d(a,v) E A : lv11 ~ a t S.~a~ 1. (By 7.3 and by the properties
(2), (3), (4) ) .
Clearly, the definition of A and the properties (1), (5) imply 1.8.1.
Further, for the set A we have:
(6) {(a,~-) E A ~ a ~ v} -{(o,o)}. (By 1.8-A1, 1.7-A4, ana {cl}m c R}'g}.
For sequences {(zt,wt)}~ C Em-1 C1 and {(xt,yt)}~ C F~:
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(7) {(at,vt)}~ defined by (at,vt) :- (zttxt,yt), t- 1,... is a sequence in A.
(8) In addition, if the inequalities zt-wt}xt-yt-1 ~ 0, t- 1,2,... are satisfied
then at-vt-1 ~ w, t- 1,2,... with v0 :- y0. (BY (1)).
(9) {(at,vt)}t-1 is bounded. (BY 7.5, (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8)).
Clearly, (9), the definition of {(at'vt)}t-1 and non-negativity of the vectors
zt,xt, imply 1.8.2.
Proof of 3.4.1.: This property is a direct consequence of boundedness of the
sets C1, wl'~ and of ni E]0,1[, i- 1,2,...,m.
m
Proof of 3.4.2.: Since the series {Lt-1 (ai)t.(zt,wt,st'1,...,st'n)}h-1 converqes,
property 3.4.2. follows from 7.1. and 7.2.
Proof of 3.4.3.: Compactness of C1 and continuity of ~i implies that, for every
{(zt,wt)}t-1 C C1, the sequence {~i(zt,wt)}t-1 is bounded, and henceforth (by
W
ni E ]0,1[) convergency of {Et-1 (~i)t'~i(zt'wt)}h-1'
Proof of 3.4.4.: Let {(zt,wt)}t-1 C C1. Defining a sequence {(zh'wh)}h-1 by
the convex combinations:
(Zh~Wh) .- ((1-nl)~(al-nhtl)).Et-1 (ni)t.(zt,wt), h - 1,2,..., concavity of
~i implies, for each h- 1,2,...
(1) mi(zh,irh) ~ ((1-ni)I(1-ni}1)).st-~ (ni)t.~vi(zt,wt).
Defining ai .- (1-ni)~ni' we have
(2) (zh,vh) -. ai.(zl,wl), for h~.
(By compactness of C1 acid by ni E] 0, 1[ )
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(3) Wi(zh,wh) -~ Wi(ai.zl,ai.wl), for h-~.
(By (2) and by continuity of cpi).
Combining 3.4.3. and the properties ( 1), (3), one will find 3.4.4.
~
Proof of 3.4.5.: It should be clear that the sequence {(zt,wt,st'1,...,st'n)}t-1'
generated by the optimal solutíon
{(zi~wi~si,1~...~si,n)} of the single-period
program 3.4-D2, is feasible w.r.t. 3.4-D1. In addition we have:
~Pi(zl,wl) - ((1-ni)~ni). Et-1 (ni)t . ~pi(zt,wt).
Now, suppose 3.4-D1 possesses a feasible solution {(zt,wt,{sl'~}n 1)}t-1 forJ-
which the value of the objective function ís higher. Then, by the proposition
3.4.1. to 3.4.4., the single period program possesses a feasible solution
- say (Zl~Wi~{S1,J}j-1) - such that ~i(zl,wl) ~ ~i(zl,wl).
However, this contradicts optimality of
(zi~Wi~{Si,j}n ).
J-1
Proof of 4.2.6.: For each j- 1,2,...,n, we distinguish three cases:
(1) Em-1 s1,J - p~ (2) Em-1 s1,J ~ p~ p~y~ - 0, (3) Em-1 sl'J ~ 0, p'zJ ~ 0.
m i
In case (1), non-negativity of p and z implies p'zJ - Ei-1 s'J. In case (2),
we have áJ - 0, implying (by 4.2.3.) sl'~ - 0, i- 1,2,...,m.
Clearly, this contradicts the assumption: Em-1 sl'J ~ 0. In case (3), proposition
2.3.5. (note: the artificial bound a in 2.3.5. is chosen large enough) implies
p'zJ - Em S1,J.i-1
Proof of 4.3.1.: Let wl be a supply vector as described in 4.3-A1, and let
n{(xJ,~J)}1 be the corresponding production vectors. Then, defining
ul - En ( J-P..xJ) t wl, and v. :- min ( ul, ul,...,ul) (Note v. ~ 0 by. J-1 ~, J~ ~ 1 1 2 n i
4.3-A1), we have for every p E Rg:
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E~-1 p'(x~-pj.x~) t p'wl ~ vl.lpll.
Since, by consistency of (p,{d~}~): p'x~ ~ d~.p'x~ ~ pj.p'x~, j- 1,2,,,,,n
(viz. 4.2.4.), this implies: p'vl ~ vl.lpll,
Proof of 5.1.3.: Let (p,{d~}~, g,{(Z1,M1)}m,{(X~,y'~)}~) be an I.C.E.
Let {({(zl,wl)}m {(X~,'y~)}n- ) }m be an invariant path generated by thist t 1-1' t t ~-1 t-1
I.C.E. Then:
i i(1) Each (zt,wt) is optimal w.r.t. max. problem (a) in 5.2.2., with p:- p
and Yi :- E~-1 sl'~. (Bij equilibrium condition 4.1-a).
(2) Each (zt,wt) is optimal w.r.t. min. problem (b) in 5.2,2., with p:- p
and ai :- ~i(zl,wl). (BY 5.2.2., property (1), and 3.3-A4).
(3) Each (zt,yt) is optimal w.r.t. max. problem (a) in 5.2.1., with p:- p
and B:- Em-1 sl'~ (By equilibrium condition k.1-a).
(4) Each (zt,yt) is optimal w.r.t. min, problem (b) in 5.2.1., with p:- F
and á:- d~. (By proposition 5.2.1, and property (3)).
(5) Each (zt,~it) is optimal w.r.t. min. problem (b) in 5.2.1., with p:- p
~ ~ ~cand ó :- p, p such that pj - p, j- 1,2,...,n. (viz. 5.2-A1).
(By (4) and the fact that d~ ~ pj implies sl'~ - 0, i- 1,2,...,m,and
so F'y - 0, as well. Viz.: 4.2.3, and 4.2.4.).
(6) Defining yó :- y~, j-],2,...,n, we have, by equilibrium condition ~~.1-d:
Em-1 (zt-wt) t E~-1 (Xt-Yt-1) - 0, t- 1,2,...
Defining a set Q C Rg by:
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- f g i i W iQ; lq E R I~{(zt,wt)}t-1 C C, i- 1,2,...,m,
m
{(xt~Yt)}t-~ C FJ~ J - 1,2,...,n:
i i i ilyi(Zt,wt) ~~i(zt,Wt), 1- 1,2,...,m, t- 1,2,...
q - Et-~ (1IP~)t.(EID-~ (zt-wt) t E~-~ (xt-(1IP~).yt))J,
the properties (2) and (3) imply that
q:- Et-1(1Ip~)t.(Em-1 (xt-Wt) t E~-~ (Xt-(~IP~).yt)) is optimal w.r.t.
min. p'q, over q E Q.
~
Further, by (4), we have F'q -(1Ip ).p'E~-~ yÓ, implying, by optimality of
q w.r.t. min p'q, over q E Q:
(7) d q E Q: p'q ?(1IP~).p'E~-~ y~.
~
Now, let {({(z~,wt)}m-1,{(zt,yt)}~-1)}t-~ a feasible path which starts from
the same initial vectors yp :- y, j- 1,2,...,n, and such that
r~i(z~,wt) ~~i(zt,wt), i- 1,2,...,m, t- 1,2,... Since this path is feasible,
theorem 1.8.2. (based on the assumptions 1.5-A1, 3, 4, 5, 1.7-A1, 4, 5, 6, 1.8-A1)
implies that is bounded; i.e.:
m
{(zt,wt)}t-1 C C1, i- 1,2,...,m, {(xtsYt)}t-~ C FJ~ J- 1,2,...,ri.
(Provided the bounds appearing in the definition of ~1 and F~, see 1.8-D1, 2
are chosen large enough). Thus, defining
de de
q :- Et-~ (1IP )t.(Em-1 (zt-wt) } E~-1 (xt-(~IP ).yt)), we have
(8) q E Q.
de
(9) q ~(1Ip ).p'E~-~ y~. ( To be deduced, straight forwards, from feasibility
condition 1.8.1. and proposition 7.2.).
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Combining (7), (8), and (9):
(10) q is optimal w.r.t. min p'q, over q E Q.
(11) Each ( it,vt) is optimal w.r.t. min. problem (b) in 5.2.2., with p:- p
and ai :- ~i(zl,wi). (By (10) and the definition of Q).
(12) Each (it,wt) is optimal w.r.t, max. problem (a) in 5.2.2., with p:- p
and y. :- En sl'~. By (11), and proposition 5.2.3. Note: by (1) andi ~-1
(2), and by ai :- ~i(zt,wt) in (11), yi has to be defi.ned: yi :- En-1 sl'~)
(13) ~pi(it,wt) - ~i(zt,wt), i- 1,2,...,m, t- 1,2,... (BY (12) and by (1)).
Clearly, the supposition concerning the alternative feasible path:
~pi(it,wt) ~ ~pi(zt,wt), t- 1,2,..., implies equality. (viz. 13).
Hence we may conclude that the path generated by the I.C.E. is weakly efficient
(viz. efficiency condition 5.2-b).
In order to prove the second part of 5.2.4., concerning strict
efficiency, we observe that assumption 5.2-A3 and the definition of the numbers
~ ~ i~{pj}~ (viz. 4.2-D1) implies: ni - 1~p , i- 1,2,...,m, where p such that pj - p
~t ic
j- 1,2,...,n. Putting n.- 1~p , we replace the set Q by:
~
Q.- 3 E RB I 3{(zt,wt)}t-1 E C1~ i - 1,2,...,m,
m
{(xt~Yt)}t-~ E F~~ j - 1,2,...,n:
Et-1
(~.t)t.mi(zt~wt) ~ Et-1 ( n~)t.~i(zt,wt), i - 1,2,...,m
q - Et-1 (n~`)t. (Em-1 (zt-wt) t E~-1 (xt-n~.yt))}.
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Further, stríct efficiency can be deduced in a similar manner as weak efficiency.
7. Appendix.
Proposition 7.1.: Let Q E Rk be a closed convex set, and let {qt}~ be a sequence
Win Q. Then, for every u E]0,1[ such that {Et-1 ut,qt}h-1 converges:
((1-U)~V). Et-1 ut.qt E Q.
Proposition 7.2.: Let {(ut,vt)}t-1 C Rk x R} be a sequence which satisfies, for
some v0 E R} and some w E Rk: ut-vt-1 ~ w, t- 1,2,...
Then, for every u E]0,1[ such that {Et-1 ut,(ut-u'vt)}h-1 converges:
Et-1 ut.(ut-u.~t) ~ u.vo t (u~(1-u)).w.
Proposition 7.3.: Let W C R2'k be a closed convex set containing the origin (0,0),
and such that W rl ({0} x Rk) is bounded. Then numbers a,s ~ 0 exist such that,
for every ( w,v) E W: IvN 1 ~ atg , IwN 1.
Proposition 7.4.: Let U C R2'k be a closed convex set containing the origin (0,0),
and such that {(u,v) E U ~ u ~ v} -{(0,0)}, Then numbers a,B ~ 0, y ~ 1 exist
such that the relations (u,v) E U, u-y.v ~ w ímply: IvB1 ~ atB.Nw11.
Proposition 7.5.: For a set U as mentioned in 7.4,, numbers y,d ~ 0 exist such
that every sequence {(ut,vt)}t-1 C U which satisfies, for some v0 E R} and some
w E Rk, u1 ~ v0, uttl-vt ~ w, t- 1,2,..., also satisfies
B(ut,vt)N1 ~ Ytó .I(v0,w)N1 , t- 1~2,...
-36-
Proof of 7.1.: Suppose {qt}t-1 is a sequence in Q, and suppose u E]0,1[ is a
number such that {E i-1 ut.qt}h-1 converges. Defining a sequence {qh}h-1 by
the convex combinations:
qh :- ((1-u)I(V-uhtl)). Et-1 ut.qt, h- 1,2,...,
we may conclude (by convexity of Q): qh E Q, h- 1,2,... In addition, convergency
of {Et-1 yh,qt}h-1 and u E[0,1[ implies convergency of {qh}h-1,
Clearly, by closedness of Q, these relations imply ((1-y)~y),Et-1 ut,qt E Q.
Yroof of 7.2.: ut-vt-1~ w, vt ? 0, t- 1,2,... implies, for every u~ 0:
Et-1 ut.(ut-u.vt) ~ u.v0 t((u-uhtl)I(1-v)).w, h- 1,2,...
Clearly, y E]0,1[ and convergency of {Et-1 Vt.(ut-u'vt)}h-1 implies:
Et-1 ut.(ut-u.~t) ~ u.~o t(ul(1-u)).w.
Proof of 7.3.: Following Rockafellar [7], we define the recession cone,rec (A),
of a set A C Rk by: rec (A) :- {a E Rk ~ V b E A, a~ 0: b ta.a E A},
Now, defining a set V:- {(w,v) E R2'k I 1w11 c 1}, we have with respect to
a set W as assumed in 7.3.:
(1) rec (W n V) - rec (W) r1 rec (V). (By closedness and convexity of W and V.
See Rockafellar 8.3.3.).
(2) rec (V) C{0} x Rk. (By the definition of V).
(3) rec (W) n({p} x Rk) -{(0,0)}. (By boundedness of the set W rl ({0} x Rk).)
(4) rec (W n V) - {(0,0)}. (BY (1), (2), and (3).)
(5) (W n V) is bounded. (By (4), and by closedness and convexity of the set
W r1 V. See Rockafellar 8.4,)
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(6) ~ a~ o: tl (w,v) E w n v: ~v~~ ~ a. (By (5).)
(7) V(w,v) E W:(1 t Iwl~)-~,(w,v) E W n V. (By the definition of set V,
convexity of V, W, and by ( 0,0) E W n V.)
(8) S a~ 0: V(w,v) E W: 1vM~ ~ a.(1 t Iwl~), (BY (6), (7), and by the
definition of set V.) .
Proof of 7.4,: Defining T:- {(u,v) E R2'k I u ~ v}, we have,for a set U as
assumed in 7.5., the following properties:
(1) rec (U n T) -{(0,0)}. (By closedness and convexity of U,T and by boundedness
of U n T. See Rockafellar 8.4,)
(2) rec (U) n T-{(0,0)}. (By closedness and convexity of U,T, by (1), and
by rec (T) - T. See Rockafellar 8.3.3.)
(3) Z y~ 1:{(u,v) E R2.k ~ u c y,v} n rec (U) -{(0,0)}. (BY (2), and by
closedness of rec (U). See Rockafellar 8.2.)
(4) S y~ 1: rec ({(u,v) E R2'k I u ~ Y.v} n jj) -{(0,0)}, (By (4), and by
closedness and convexity of the sets U and {(u,v) E R2'k I u ~ y.v},
See Rockafellar 8.3.3.)
Now, defining,for a y~ 1 such that (4) holds,a set W by
W:- {(w,v) E R2'k I S u E Rk ;(u,v) E U~ u-y,v ~ w}, we have:
(5) W is closed, convex, and contains the origin. (By the assumptions concerning
U.)
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(6) W n({p} x Rk) is bounded. (By (4), (5), and by the definition of W.
See Rockafellar 8.4.)
(7) 3 Y~ 1, á ~ 0: tl u.v~w E Rk ~(u,v) E U, u-Y.v ~ w:
Ivl~ ~ d.lwl~ t á. (By 7.3., by (6), and by the definition of W.)
Proof of 7.5.: Let a,B ~ 0, y~ 0, be the numbers as mentioned in 7.4,
Let, for some vp E Rt and some w E Rk, {(ut~vt)}~-~ C U be sequence which
satisfies ut-vt-~ ~ w, t- 1,2,... Defining a sequence {(uh,vh)}h-~ by the
convex combinations: (i~,vh) :- ((y-1)~(y-y~-h)),Et-~ yt-h.(ut,vt), h- 1,2,...,
we have:
(1) (uh,vh) E U, h- 1,2,... (By convexity of U.)
(2) uh-Y~vh ~ w t (Y-h(Y-~)~(Y-Y~-h)).vp, h- 1,2,...
(By ut-vt-~ ~ w, t- 1,2,..., and by vt ~ 0, t- 1,2,...)
Since the coefficient y-h(y-1)~(y-y~-h) is non-increasing with respect to h
(implied by d~ 1), property (2) implies the existence of a vector w such that:
(3) ~- Y.vh ~ v, h- 1,2,...
By virtue of 7.4., the relations (1) and (3) imply:
(4) Mvhl~ ~ a t B.Iwl~, h- 1,2,..., where a,6 are the numbers indicated by
7,4.
(5) Iv 1 ~ atB.lwl~. h- 1,2,... (BY (4)~ bY vt ? 0, t- 1,2,..., and byh 1 - -
the definition of {(i~,vh)}h-~,)
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(6) 1un11 c li,r11 t at R. I~r11, h- 1,2,... (By (5), and by
ut c w t vt, ut ~ 0, t- 1,2,...).
Clearly, the inequalities (5), (6), and the defínition of w, imply 7.5
List of symbols.
Rn, n-dimensional vectorspace
Rt ;- {x E Rn I xi ~ 0, i - 1,2,...,n}, the non-negative orthant.
~.N 1, the 11-norm, for x E Rn, defined by Ix11 ' ~ Ei-1 Ixil'
d.x scalar-vector multiplication.
x'y, the inner product of a pair of finite dimensional vectors.
( x,Y] :- {z E Rn I z~ x, z c Y},
] x,Y] :- {z E Rn I z~ x, z c y}
( x,Y( :- {z E Rn ~ z~ x, z c y}
] x,y{ :- {z E Rn ~ z~ x, z c y}
( a,8] n.- {z E Rn I zi E ( a,6] ,
the n-dim. closed interval.
i- 1,2,...,n}, a,s being scalars.
The sum of sets A1,A2,...,Ak in Rn:
gk-1 A1 ,- {x E Rn ~~{xl}~ C Rn : xl E A1, i- 1,2,...,k, x- Ei-1 xl}
C: X-~ Y, siJigle-valued function from X to Y.
C: X w Y, set-valued function from X to Y.
Graph of C: X~ Y: graph (X;C) :- {(x,y) E Xxy I y E C(x)}.
- ~,o -
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